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ABSTRACT
The field of Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) lies at the intersection
of several disciplines, and is rightfully perceived as a prime interface
between engineering and the social sciences. In particular, our field
entertains close ties with social and cognitive psychology, and there
are many HRI studies which build upon commonly accepted results
from psychology to explore the novel relation between humans
and machines. Key to this endeavour is the trust we, as a field, put
in the methodologies and results from psychology, and it is exactly
this trust that is now being questioned across psychology and, by
extension, should be questioned in HRI.
The starting point of this paper are a number of failed attempts
by the authors to replicate old and established results on social
facilitation, which leads us to discuss our arguable over-reliance
and over-acceptance of methods and results from psychology. We
highlight the recent “replication crisis” in psychology, which di-
rectly impacts the HRI community and argue that our field should
not shy away from developing its own reference tasks.
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1 THE REPLICATION CRISIS IN
PSYCHOLOGY ANDWHAT IT MEANS FOR
HRI
The field of Human-Robot Interaction (HRI), and in particular, the
field of social HRI benefits from awide range of scientific input [4, 5].
As a community, we recognise that the technical fields of engineer-
ing, control theory and computer science do not provide necessary
tools for the scientific investigation of the ‘human’ and ’interaction’
parts of HRI. For this reason, we take inspiration and ground much
of our research in established results from the social sciences – pri-
marily social psychology, cognitive psychology, and sociology. As
scholars in HRI we find ourselves at the intersection of these many
fields, and aim to offer insights to programmers and engineers, as
well as psychologists. In this sense, our field embodies the basic
idea of cognitive sciences: building bridges across disciplines to
gain new insights on complex scientific challenges.
That said, the demographics of the academics working in HRI
are skewed towards engineering backgrounds (Table 1); one often
becomes a researcher in HRI by first building robots and then
looking at how the machines might interact with humans. While
some of us do have training in psychology, many do not. This is
not an issue per se: as trained scientists and engineers, we can
read and interpret the social science literature, and reproduce tasks,
protocols, and –perhaps– results.
However, the recent replication crisis in psychology now casts
doubt on that premise. Aarts et al. [1], in their seminal study, found
that upon attempting to replicate 100 psychology studies, only
39% of the replication studies could subjectively be rated to have
replicated the original result. As the results of two thirds of 100
studies could not be properly replicated, whatever the reasonsmight
be (from publication bias, to sociological changes in the population,
Table 1: Academic fields of accepted authors at HRI17, as
judged by their affiliation or, if advertised on their personal
website, training, n = 193 (a single author can be affiliated
with multiple fields).
Field Eng. Psy. Cog. Sci. Interaction
Design
Other
N 145 24 6 17 13
% 70.73 11.71 2.93 8.29 6.34
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to small effect sizes), it calls for exerting caution whenever we build
upon supposedly established results.
Further research has shown that many scientific studies are
difficult or impossible to replicate upon subsequent investigation.
According to a 2016 poll of almost 1,600 scientists reported in the
journal Nature, over 70% had failed to reproduce at least one other
scientist’s experiment. More than half had failed to reproduce one
of their own experiments [3]. This is problematic for the field of
Human-Robot Interaction, as much of what we do either uses re-
search methods similar to those used in other disciplines (and psy-
chology in particular), or relies directly on insights and results
handed down from other disciplines.
Because many of us are consumers of the psychology literature
rather than producers or active contributors to the psychology com-
munity, we often do not only have insufficient training to correctly
interpret psychological studies, but also tend to be less critical and
often do not question findings thewaywewould in our own commu-
nity. This effect is reinforced by the perceived maturity of different
academic fields. Fields such as social or cognitive psychology are
very mature, compared to the relative immaturity of Human-Robot
Interaction, and studies and insights from psychology are now core
material in textbooks, giving the studies and their results further
credence.
While experienced researchers in HRI might already be aware
of these issues, the influx of new talent requires our field to be
vigilant of uncritical reliance on questionable methods and results.
To illustrate our point, we present our experience in which we
were unsuccessful at reproducing the social facilitation effect. Social
facilitation, also known as the audience effect, is a supposedly well-
established effect where the mere presence of a (silent, passive)
external agent influences one’s behaviour, often measured through
performance on a task. The direction in which the effect works is
not specified: depending on the task and the context, performance
can be positively or negatively impacted. A large body of literature
from psychology reports this effect, and social facilitation has been
studied in robotics as well in various forms.
2 A CASE IN POINT: SOCIAL FACILITATION
2.1 Context: Studying the Mere Presence Effect
in Social Facilitation
Background and Related Theories. In 1898, Triplett [37] observed
that cyclists pedal faster in the presence of rivals than when they
are alone. He later studied this effect on children by using a fishing
reel that they needed to turn as quickly as possible and found the
same effect, although a later analysis of his work by Stroebe [34]
showed that there was no significant difference in either of his
findings. This effect has later been termed as ‘social facilitation’ by
Allport [2] to describe the increase in response due to the presence
of others who are performing the same task. Later the term social fa-
cilitation was expanded to cover two types of conditions: ‘co-action
effects’ like Triplett’s examples, and ‘audience effects’, in which
only the mere presence of an observer affects the performance of a
person performing the task. In order to explain the audience effects,
Zajonc [42] proposed the drive theory, which states that the audi-
ence enhances the exhibition of dominant responses in a person. In
the case of a well-mastered task (‘simple task’), the performance is
facilitated, whereas, for the tasks that are new or require learning
(‘complex tasks’), the performance is inhibited.
Factors. A meta-analysis by Bond and Titus [8] compared 202
published and 39 unpublished studies on social facilitation. They
provide a list of 13 factors that might impact social facilitation
(like the participants’ age, the number of observers, the role of the
observers, the familiarity of the observers, etc.). The meta-study
shows that the performance speed (quantity) is increased for the
simple tasks and the performance accuracy (quality) is decreased
for the complex tasks. The performance quantity is measured by
the latency to respond, time it takes to complete a task and the
number of responses per unit time. The performance quality is
measured by the number of errors. The analysis also showed that
the visibility (presence in the same room as the subject) of the
observers has a slightly larger effect than the non-visibility (e.g.,
one-way mirror [11, 14], use of a video camera [16, 36], a desktop
image on a computer screen [15]), although the difference was not
statistically significant.
On the other hand, Guerin [17] argues in his review that the
majority of studies on social facilitation had observers watching
the subject perform a task. These could be confederates, but often
they are just the experimenter watching a subject, as they were
not seen being busy with other tasks. He also draws attention to
ceiling and floor effects of the tasks, and advises that the task should
be sufficiently hard so that a reasonable comparison can be made
between subjects and conditions.
Tasks. Following Zajonc [42], the literature on social facilitation
distinguishes between ‘simple tasks’ and ‘complex tasks’. Exam-
ples of simple tasks include cancelling specific letters in a text or
multiplication; examples of complex tasks include concept forma-
tion, anagrams, digit span, and pursuit rotor tasks (a motor task
in which the subject has to track a rotating target using a com-
puter mouse). Tasks such as letter copying and paired associates
can be either simple or complex depending on the task structure.
McCaffrey et al. [23] also presented significance levels of each of
these tasks in the literature. They show that visual perception and
construction tasks such as letter or word copying [15, 18, 36] and
motor tasks such as physical activities [35] are good tasks in terms
of significance as simple tasks. Memory or learning tasks such as
paired associates [10, 16, 17] and visuomotor tasks as in the rotary
pursuit task [22, 25] have higher significance for social facilitation
as complex tasks.
Cheating as a reinforcing factor. Self-presentation theory [7] also
suggests conformity to normative behaviours to gain approval
of another person. For example, in the case of an embarrassing
situation such as cheating, this should prevent the subject from
engaging in the cheating behaviour due to social pressure. There
might be several factors that affect cheating behaviour, such as the
importance of the task, the risk of being caught, the probability
of success [39], the belief in free-will [40], the knowledge of peer
performance [19], the potential gain of money or grades, the penalty
for cheating [26] or conformity to cheating behaviour in peers [13].
In the study by Vohs and Schooler [40], the task consisted of a
computer-based mental arithmetic test. The participants were told
that there was a “glitch” in the program which shows the correct
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answer to the problem, but they could close the answer window
by pressing a key after the problem appeared. They were also told
that the experimenter would not know whether they pressed the
bar, but they should try to solve the problems without looking at
the answer. The results revealed that those who were given an
essay prior to the test that stated the lack of free-will cheated more
frequently than others.
Social Facilitation In Robotics. The audience effect has been stud-
ied in HRI by Schermerhorn et al. [32] and Riether et al. [27]. Scher-
merhorn et al. [32] compared the effect of the robot’s presence
during easy and difficult arithmetic tasks with alone and robot-
presence conditions. A significant two-way interaction between
gender and robot was found, because the subjects performed worse
during the difficult task when the robot was present. Overall, a
marginally significant effect of robot presence was found. Riether
et al. [27] on the other hand, compared alone, human-presence,
and anthropomorphic robot-presence conditions with four differ-
ent tasks with easy and complex conditions: anagram solving, nu-
merical distance, finger tapping and a motor reaction task. They
observed that in the anagram solving, numerical distance and finger
tapping tasks, there were significantly larger performance scores
than the alone group for both the robot and human conditions,
but there was no significant difference between the robot and the
human observer conditions. Authors concluded that this finding
suggests that people regard robots as social beings. After the ex-
periment, the subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire in
which they gave higher observation impression scores for the robot
condition than the human observer, perhaps due to the fact that
they thought someone else was watching through the eyes of the
robot or due to novelty effects leading to distraction.
Following the findings from social facilitation literature, we de-
cided to explore the mere presence of two robotic platforms (the
Softbank Robotics NAO and Pepper robots) through a social fa-
cilitation task. We anticipated that there would be a difference
between the two platforms due to their size and appearance. While
the studies aimed to compare the social facilitation of two different
robots, it was important to establish two baselines first: one with
no observers, and one with the social facilitation elicited by the
presence of a human observer. This would essentially be a first step
in validating our methodology and would also serve as replication
of the finding from psychology. Assuming the replication study
was successful, we would have continued the experiments with a
robot as observer and would have compared these results to the
earlier obtained baselines.
We ran two separate studies, with a total of three different tasks.
Because no effect could be found between the alone condition and
the human condition in any of our tasks, we did not actually pursue
the studies with robots.
2.2 Social Facilitation: First Attempt
The first study was run between-subjects with two conditions: an
alone condition and a human-presence condition. Participants were
recruited on a university campus and taken to a room in the cam-
pus library for the experiment. The experimenter would take the
participant to the room and tell them to follow instructions on the





Figure 1: Layout of the room. The participant (A) is sitting at
a table, with their back to the door. The tasks are performed
on a tablet (B). When present, the social agent (human ob-
server) is placed at C.
condition, a second experimenter would already be sitting in the
room and would remain there for the duration of the experiment
(as per Figure 1).
Tasks. The literature distinguishes between the effects of mere
presence on simple tasks and complex tasks. We sought to elicit
differences in both of these task types. Each participant therefore
performed two tasks, followed by a brief questionnaire. Both the
tasks and the questionnaire were administered on the tablet. The
first task was designed to be a repetitive visuomotor task (the
‘shape matching’ task); the second one required recollection and
comprehension of spoken information (the ‘story’ task). As such,
we examined the effect of social facilitation on both low- and high-
cognitive tasks.
The ‘shape matching’ task is a game where the participants are
asked to match a coloured target shape with another one, of the
same shape, but of a different colour (Figure 2). The target shape as
well as the eight possible responses are random combinations from
the sets {red, yellow, green, purple, blue, white} and {square, cross,
star, circle}. After the participant touches a shape to select it as an
answer, a new random set is shown on screen. This is repeated
200 times. By using the same random seed for all participants, the
stimuli sequence was kept identical for all participants.
The task can be repeated for up to 200 rounds of random shapes.
After 75 rounds, a button labelled “Give up” appears on screen,
giving the participant the option to skip to the second task. The
wording of the label was intentionally chosen instead of a more
neutral “Stop” or “Continue to next task” to elicit a stronger so-
cial response (“Giving up” being more socially costly than simply
“continuing to the next task”), thereby increasing the contrast be-
tween conditions (self-presentation effect). During this first task,
we recorded three metrics: the reaction time for each round, the
number of correct and incorrect responses, and the total number
of rounds completed. We also asked the participants to give an
estimate of how many rounds they thought they had completed,
between 0 and 300.
The second task (‘story’ task) involves listening to a short pre-
recorded text (1min 56sec) and answering eight questions about
this text. The text1 details the history of a fictional country named
“Brookland” and includes a range of facts: names of places (“[they]
sailed to Port Danford”), dates (“Springland was settled in the year
1Recording and transcript available on-line, at https://github.com/severin-lemaignan/
shapes-matching/tree/master/audio.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of the shape matching task. Partici-
pants are instructed to tap on the picture matching the tar-
get’s shape (seen at the top), but with a different colour. In
this example, the participant has to tap the green square.
2503”), terminology (“Settlers or ’squatters’ began to move deeper
into the territories”), and situations (“Women were outnumbered
five to one”). The text was based upon the settling of Australia, but
with key details and place names changed. This was so that the
information would certainly be novel, without sounding implau-
sible. The eight multiple-choice questions are asked immediately
after the end of the text. Each question provides a choice of four
answers (Figure 3). The score of each participant (number of correct
answers) is the performance metric for this task.
Hypotheses. Based on the drive theory by Zajonc [42], our hy-
potheses were the following:
H1 In the ‘shape matching’ task, the presence of a social agent
would lead to better performance: fewer mistakes, faster
reaction times.
H2 In the presence of a social agent, the ‘Give up’ button would
be used less frequently (or later in the game) due to the social
pressure (self-presentation theory).
H3 In the presence of a social agent, participants would report
that they completed fewer rounds of shape matching than
they actually did, due to social facilitation.
H4 In the ‘story’ task, the presence of a social agent would lead
to the impaired performance, i.e., participants would recall
fewer facts.
Protocol & Data Collection. We recruited 45 participants after ex-
clusion (25 for the alone condition and 20 for the human condition,
16 males, 29 females, balanced across conditions) on campus. The
participants’ age was M=20.4 (SD=2.5). We ensured that all partici-
pants who enrolled were not colour-blind (due to the necessity of
seeing colour accurately for the shape matching task) and that they
were native English speakers (to prevent comprehension issues due
to language in the story task).
Participants were first given information sheets describing the
experiment (simply entitled “Learningwith a touchscreen”, so as not
Figure 3: Screenshot of four of the eight questions admin-
istered immediately after listening to a short text about a
fictional country.
to disclose the role of themere presence of the observers). They then
gave consent to participate, compliant with the university ethics
committee rules. Participants were told in writing and verbally
that whether or not they decided to withdraw early from the study,
they would receive financial compensation of £5 (in the form of a
voucher). We made this point explicit to make sure the participants
knew that, even if they quit the shape matching game early (i.e.,
between rounds 75 and 200), they would still receive the full amount.
Results. We did not observe any significant difference between
the two conditions concerning the time required to match 75 shapes,
average reaction time, number of shape completed, ratio of correct
matching, recall performance, or perceived observation (cf. Table 2).
This means that we did not observe any social facilitation effect,
and none of the hypotheses are supported.
2.3 Second Attempt
Reflecting on the lack of effect observed in our first attempt, we
designed a second experiment to address the possible failures of
the first one.
Specifically, we chose (1) to have the human observer closer to
the participant (aiming for greater human influence), (2) a stronger
moral component (aiming for a greater influence of the human pres-
ence), (3) a more difficult task (stronger incentive for behavioural
differences – i.e., cheating – between conditions), (4) financial re-
ward dependent on performance (stronger, clearer incentive for
behavioural differences between conditions) and finally, (5) regard-
ing the methodology, we decided to move away from primarily
using reaction times as metric, so as to avoid any natural perfor-
mance limit.
Task. Based on these constraints, we designed a new task involv-
ing mental arithmetic. Participants were required to calculate the
result of a set of non-trivial mental additions. The additions each
had exactly three 2-digit numbers to sum, one carry (a digit that is
transferred from one column of digits to another), and their results
ranged from 100 to 200. Participants had 5 minutes to perform as
many additions as possible. Each correct answer would earn them
a small financial reward of £0.20 (Figure 4).
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Table 2: Results for the shape matching task: time to match 75 shapes, average reaction time, number of shapes completed,
ratio of perceived matching, recall performance, and perceived observation. No significance has been observed for any of the
metrics (2-tailed independent 2-samples test with equal variance assumption).
Metric Alone conditionM(SD) Human conditionM(SD) p-value t-value
Time to 75 shapes (s) 117.7 (30.01) 110.63 (17.25) .349 0.948
Average reaction time (s) 1.70 (0.47) 1.58 (0.26) .305 1.037
Number of shapes completed 196 (11.5) 198 (7.8) .522 −0.596
Ratio of correct responses 0.98 (0.02) 0.99 (0.01) .082 −1.813
Recall performance 4.81 (1.27) 5.11 (1.49) .473 −0.724
Perceived observation 2.76 (1.27) 2.55 (1.39) .6 0.528
Figure 4: Screenshot of the sums task. Participants have 5
minutes to perform asmanymental additions of three num-
bers (with a result between 100 and 200) as possible. Each
correct answer earns £0.20. A pop-up dialogue with the an-
swer is shown before each new addition. The participants
are instructed that this pop-up is a bug and that they should
ignore it and dismiss it.
Critically, following the design of Vohs and Schooler [40], a sup-
posed “glitch” was showing a pop-up dialogue before each addition.
This dialogue was designed to look like a spurious debug dialogue
and contained the expected answer. The participants were explicitly
shown by the experimenter that the correct answer was erroneously
displayed in the dialogue. They were instructed to ignore the dia-
logue and to dismiss it. This ‘bug’ was explained to the participant
as being caused by a new operating system on the laptops used for
the test (“Our previous computers did not have this issue”). The
bug made it practically easy for participants to cheat: by briefly
glimpsing at the debug dialogue before dismissing it, they could
immediately know the correct answer, and earn money faster.
The dialogue could be dismissed by pressing ‘enter’ on the key-
board. ‘Enter’ was also the key used to move to the next question.
As such, a double-press would move to the next question and close
the dialogue before it could be seen. Through this mechanism, it
was possible to measure how long it took participants to close the
dialogue, and infer whether they had cheated.
Hypotheses. The literature suggests that social presence during
a complex cognitive task like this one should lead to worse perfor-
mance [12, 41]. Accordingly, our hypotheses were the following:
H1 In the presence of a social agent, participants will be more
honest (i.e., they will look at the answer on the dialogue
pop-up less).
H2 In the presence of a social agent, participants will complete
fewer correct questions.
Protocol & Data Collection. As outlined previously, while our plan
was to run four conditions (alone, human presence, NAO presence,
Pepper presence), we first ran the two baseline conditions: alone
and with a human observer. 15 participants were recruited in the
alone condition, 16 participants in the human condition.
The experimental setup was similar to Figure 1 with two differ-
ences: when present, the human observer was sitting at the table,
facing the participant, and the tablets were replaced with laptops
with a keyboard to facilitate the input of the answers. For each
participant, we recorded how many additions were attempted, the
total gain (i.e., the number of correct answers), and the time to
calculate each of the additions. We also asked, upon completion, to
what extent they felt like they were being observed during the test
(marked on a 5-point Likert scale).
Results. Based on the data (31 participants for a total of 633
additions), the average time to dismiss the debug dialogue was
1185ms and the average time to provide an answer was 9980ms.
Based on these values, we conservatively consider cheating as
takingmore than 0.8 seconds to dismiss the spurious debug dialogue
and taking less than 5 seconds to calculate the sum and providing
a correct answer. It results in 147 cheating rounds (23.2% of all
rounds).
Looking at these results per condition, we find 77 rounds involv-
ing cheating from 316 rounds in the human condition (24.4%) and
70 rounds involving cheating from 317 rounds in the alone condi-
tion (22.1%). A 2-samples test for equality of proportions reveals no
significant difference; χ2 = 0.463, p = .496. This indicates no support
for the presence of a human impacting the tendency to cheat. This
result shows that participants do cheat relatively often, however
the presence of a human observer does not significantly impact the
cheating behaviour of the participants, providing no support for
H1.
In terms of performance, participants in the human presence
condition gave 28 wrong answers out of 239 rounds with no cheat-
ing (11.7% were wrong answers), while participants in the alone
condition gave 25 wrong answers out of 247 (10.1%). Using a 2-
samples test for equality of proportions, we obtain: χ2 = 0.096, p =
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.757 indicating no support that the presence of a human impacts the
performance in the test. Again, there is no significant performance
difference between the two conditions, providing no support for
H2. Therefore, neither of our hypotheses are supported. Due to the
absence of any effects between the human and alone conditions,
we did not pursue the study with robots.
Participants were asked how observed they felt on a in a Likert
scale (1: “Not at all”, 5: “Very much”). In the alone condition they
felt more observed (M = 2.69, SD = 1.35) than the participants in
the human presence condition (M = 1.75, SD = 1.06). A 2-tailed
independent 2-samples test with equal variance assumption shows
that there is significant difference: t(28) = 2.179, p = .038.
3 DISCUSSION
We can only speculate about which factors might explain our failure
to observe any effect of social facilitation: the small effect sizes of
social facilitation, the setting in which we collected our experimen-
tal data, or a bias towards publishing only positive results [31] that
might mask how brittle social facilitation effects really are.
Participants also reported the they felt observed: in the alone
condition this wasM = 2.69, SD = 1.31, while in the human condi-
tionM = 1.75, SD = 1.03. When no experimenter was in the room,
they feltmore observed then when there was an experimenter in the
room. This is a very notable result warranting further exploration.
The challenges of observing social interaction. What does this
failed attempt at reproducing a “classic” result of social psychology
tell us? Beyond possible experimental confounds, our failure at re-
producing these results is likely due to the small effect size of social
facilitation. In their meta-analysis of studies on social facilitation,
Bond and Titus [8] showed that the overall mean effect sizes are
low, ranging from 0.03 to 0.36. Uziel [38] reports weighted average
effect sizes of less than 0.2. According to Cohen [9], an effect size
of 0.2 should be regarded as small, an effect size of 0.5 as medium,
and 0.8 as large.
Social facilitation or inhibition, like many other psychological
effects, may be affected by a combination of several other factors:
the observer effect (also known as the Hawthorne effect [28]), de-
mand characteristics, cultural differences and personality. These
effects are potential confounds, and adequately accounting for each
of these in the experimental design is problematic.
One likely explanation is that subjects felt observed in both
conditions, irrespective of a human observer sitting with them in
the room. Just the process of taking part in a study might already
exert a large degree of social facilitation, which is not measurably
weakened or strengthened by the absence or presence of an observer
in the experiment room.
The study of Guerin [18] is relevant in this context: it tried to sep-
arate the effect of observer presence from evaluation apprehension.
For this a letter copying task was used in four conditions: alone;
with a confederate sitting in front of the subject, but facing away;
with a confederate at a desk that is behind the subject; and with
a confederate sitting behind the subject with no desk in between.
Guerin’s results showed that there were no significant differences
of errors in copying (quality) in any conditions, however, alone
and front conditions combined were significantly different from
the behind and behind-desk conditions combined in terms of task
performance (quantity).
Furthermore, he used self-reports for determining the level of
pressure the subjects felt. Subjects in the alone condition were
asked to imagine how they would feel if there was a person in the
room. The results showed that the subjects in the alone condition
felt more disturbed and evaluated than those of the other three
conditions, which concurs with the results we found. However, he
noted that self-reports in social facilitation research may be affected
by demand characteristics and self-presentation. As a result of the
study, he was unable to separate evaluation apprehension from the
mere presence effect on task performance.
It is likely that the subjects in our study felt observed by taking
part in a study. Even though the true intent of the study was not
revealed until the debriefing, subjects felt observed whatever the
condition and this might have impacted their behaviour. This is
know as the Hawthorne effect. However, the Hawthorne effect
itself is a subject of discussion as there are studies that challenge
its existence. Jones [21] studied the original experiment data [28],
and found that there is slight or no evidence of a Hawthorne effect.
McCambridge et al. [24] reviewed over 19 studies that investigate
the Hawthorne effect, and argued that the term is used to describe a
broad range of effects in the literature rather than the core definition
which refers to the change in subjects’ behaviour due to conformity
to perceived norms or researcher expectations. Hence, they could
not confirm whether the effect exists.
Weak methods in older psychology literature. Beyond the caution
that must be observed when studying one specific psychological
effect, a broader range of methodological issues with older research
in psychology might explain why some results in psychology are
incorrectly believed to be reliable.
For instance, the Bond and Titus [8] meta-analysis of research
on social facilitation claims to have exhaustively examined every
publication prior to the publication of the meta-analysis itself (in
1983). As a matter of fact, the oldest study that they reference dates
from 1898, and 35 out of the 241 were published prior to 1965.
As such, social facilitation is a good example of an old, classical
psychological effect. It however also hints at the fact that its char-
acterisation might have relied on weak research methodologies by
today’s standards. In that regard, Bond and Titus raise interesting
points: only 100 out of the 241 studies state that the experimenter
was in a different room in the alone condition (and in 96 studies,
we know the experimenter was in the room). This would be seen
today as a serious confound. Similarly, Bond and Titus report that
72.3% of the total participants were undergrad students, pointing
to a possible demographic bias.
Biases in scientific publishing: the ‘file drawer’ problem. Coined
in 1979 by Rosenthal [30], the file drawer problem refers to the bias
introduced into the scientific literature by mainly publishing pos-
itive results, and rarely negative or non-confirmatory results. As
a consequence, an effect could be reported and believed reliable,
simply for the lack of literature showing the contrary. Rosenthal
proposes to account for this problem by reporting in meta-analysis
the ‘fail-safe N’ measure: N is the number of null effects that would
be required to make the original result non-significant. Rosenthal
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considers an effect resistant to the ‘file drawer problem’ of unre-
ported null effects if the fail-safe N is above 5k + 10, with k the
number of reported effects.
Bond and Titus [8] report the fail-safe N for some of the effects
of social facilitation. For instance, their meta-analysis show that
the performance quantity of participants for complex tasks reliably
decreases in presence of an observer (even thought the effect size
is small). 54 effects are reported, and they note that the fail-safe N
value is 160: 160 is clearly smaller than 5 × 54 + 10 = 280 and as
such, this result could well be subject to the problem of unreported
null effect. The fact that social presence inhibits the performance in
complex tasks is not a robust result in the face of the bias towards
publishing only positive results.
A weighted calculation of the fail-safe number has been pro-
posed [29] that addresses some of the concerns with Rosenthal’s
proposal, and while not systematically reported in the literature,
this metric is a valuable tool for HRI researchers when assessing
how robust a result in psychology is.
4 CONCLUSION
While we have built this paper around social facilitation and our
failed attempt at replicating this well-established effect, the obser-
vations we make above are broadly applicable to Human-Robot
Interaction. Our failure to replicate a result from social psychology
which has stood for 120 years [37] should form a cautionary tale.
The limited reproducibility of results in psychology seems to be
endemic [1] and while the reasons for the lack of reproducibility
are many and diverse, there is a genuine concern that the field
of HRI is also affected. We are, however, not suggesting that HRI
should not build upon psychology anymore. Quite the contrary.
Our field has strong ties with psychology, and our work is grounded
in various theoretical and methodological frameworks. If anything,
we encourage the community to keep on building new links with
neighbouring academic fields, and social psychology should be a
preferred partner in this effort.
However, we need to be frank: results from social psychology,
experimental methodologies and reporting methods which were
considered as commonly accepted or even gold standards until
recently, are losing their special status. Instead we would like to
offer the following suggestions to the HRI field:
Replicate and reproduce. When replicating a social psychology
effect with robots, it is necessary to first reproduce the effect with
people. Methods change, times and mores change, and negative re-
sults often go unreported. A social psychology effect which is touted
in textbooks might not be that easy to replicate. With psychology
at the centre of the recent replication controversy, many results
which seem established should be approached with the necessary
skepticism.
Null-results are interesting. The field of HRI most likely also
suffers from publication bias and the file drawer effect: many studies
go unreported because the results are inconclusive, negative or
because they do not support an agenda. If results are negative
or insignificant, the field needs to know. This helps us focus our
resources better: if an experiment returned negative results and
we know about it, then it can help us avoid setting up a similar
experiment. It also helps us with quantifying bold claims. As results
come in that are inconclusive or unsupportive of those claims, they
tend to go unpublished or do not get the same amount of airtime
and attention as confirmatory results. This culture should change.
Avoid questionable research practices. A number of questionable
research practices (QRPs) have been identified in social psychol-
ogy [20, 33]. While we have not collected data on the presence of
QRPs in HRI, we need to be aware of the QRPs identified in psy-
chology. Examples include (from [20]) selective reporting of data,
or only reporting data which support a particular story; collecting
data until the results are significant; p-value rounding, i.e., rounding
p-values down to .05 to suggest statistical significance (a particular
problem of null-hypothesis testing); failing to report all conditions;
or selectively reporting studies that “worked”.
Register your study. In clinical studies, it is customary to register
the study protocol before beginning data collection (see for example
clinicaltrials.gov). Perhaps a similar practice should be established
for HRI. Among the many benefits, the registration of trials before
running include the reduction of publication bias, the efficient
allocation of research resources, and full engagement with ethical
obligations of the research community.
Avoid the Hawthorne effect. The set-up of most HRI studies often
reveals to the subjects that they are being observed: lab-based
studies always implicitly signal to subjects that their behaviour will
be monitored. Even moving into a naturalistic environment might
not alleviate this problem, as ethics procedures insist that subjects
are briefed before a study and that their explicit consent is sought
before they can engage in the experiment. As such, subjects in HRI
experiments might always experience the Hawthorne effect: their
behaviour changes because they are aware of being observed. The
only way forward here is to either not inform subjects prior to the
study (which is unethical) or work with a distractor task. However,
the latter is particularly difficult to implement in HRI.
Come up with HRI reference tasks. While there is merit in at-
tempting to reproduce effects from social psychology with robots
instead of people, it might be worth identifying new effects and
tasks relevant to Human-Robot Interaction and its applications.
Times change and as robots become more ubiquitous, our response
to robots is likely to evolve rapidly. We need to look at the relation
and interaction between people and robots through new lenses, and
the old (often very old) views from social psychology are perhaps
no longer applicable or appropriate. It may be noted that our imple-
mentation of the methodology did not perfectly match one from
psychology. The task used in the second attempt was the same as
one from psychology, however, we did not deploy the essay writ-
ing portion of the original [40] so as not to introduce a confound.
Finding an appropriate methodology to replicate in the context of
HRI was a challenge in itself, further reinforcing the need for our
own reference tasks.
As a community, HRI should learn from its own mistakes (see
Baxter et al. [6] for good advice) and from the mistakes of others.
We are a young community, with a steady influx of young talent,
and we often look towards established fields for guidance. But when
exactly these established fields start to question their own practices
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and results, we should too. The conclusion of the Science study on
reproducibility in psychology [1] offers the following message:
Following this intensive effort to reproduce a sample
of published psychological findings, how many of the
effects can we confirm are true? Zero. And, howmany
of the effects can we confirm are false? Zero. Is this a
limitation of the project design? No. It is the reality
of doing science, even if it is not appreciated in daily
practice.
Importantly, this is the reality of doing science in general, not
only social science. We must not blind ourselves: our methods and
protocols in HRI do not shelter us from the exact same problems
experienced in other fields. Future researchers may well write the
same kind of article about our field when they revisit today’s litera-
ture on Human-Robot Interaction.
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